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The standard property rights approach is focused on ex ante investment incentives, while
there are no transaction costs that might restrain ex post negotiations. We explore the
implications of such transaction costs. Prominent conclusions of the property rights
theory may be overturned: A party may have stronger investment incentives when a non-
investing party is the owner, and joint ownership can be the uniquely optimal ownership
structure. Intuitively, an ownership structure that is unattractive in the standard model
may now be desirable, because it implies large gains from trade, such that the parties are
more inclined to incur the transaction costs.
& 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Why are integrated firms sometimes more successful than non-integrated firms, while in other instances the opposite
holds true? Under which circumstances are joint ventures a recommendable governance structure? In the past three
decades, questions along these lines have often been discussed by contract theorists in the context of the property rights
approach to the theory of the firm, which has been developed in the pathbreaking contributions by Grossman and Hart
(1986), Hart and Moore (1990), and Hart (1995).1
Consider a seller (A) and a buyer (B) of an intermediate product. Should the seller own the relevant physical assets that
are needed to produce the intermediate good (non-integration) or should the buyer be the owner (integration)? Might joint
ownership, such that both parties have veto power over the use of the assets, be a good idea? The property rights approach
is focused on the role of non-contractible investments that a party can make in its human capital (say, at some initial date 0).
After the investments are sunk, collaboration between the parties becomes contractible and negotiations may occur (we willer B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
.
rg.de (D. Müller), patrick.schmitz@uni-koeln.de (P.W. Schmitz).
terature review. A very crisp summary of the literature is provided by Hart (2011).
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sunk there are no relevant transaction costs, such that in line with the Coase Theorem negotiations always lead to an ex post
efficient agreement. Specifically, the parties divide the attainable surplus from collaboration according to the Nash bar-
gaining solution, where the threatpoint is determined by the ownership structure. Asset ownership improves a party's
bargaining position and hence its incentives to invest. Prominent insights of the property rights theory are that (i) if only
one party has a relevant investment decision, then this party should be the owner, and (ii) joint asset ownership is never
optimal.
In the present paper, we extend the standard property rights model by explicitly taking into account transaction costs
that may restrain the parties from reaching an efficient agreement at date 2. Following an insightful paper by Anderlini and
Felli (2006), we model transaction costs in the most straightforward way that one might imagine. Specifically, at date 1 both
parties simultaneously and independently have to decide whether to incur the relevant transaction costs before the
negotiations can take place. The negotiation phase (date 2) is reached only if both parties pay their respective transaction
costs.2 If at least one of the parties decides not to incur its transaction costs such that the negotiations do not start or if the
negotiations do not lead to an agreement, then each party gets its default payoff only. It turns out that in the presence of
transaction costs, some of the main conclusions of the property rights theory may be overturned. In particular, (i) ownership
by the non-investing party and (ii) joint ownership can be optimal.
In the first step, let us assume that there is no investment decision to be made. In line with the standard property rights
approach, let the default payoffs depend on the ownership structure as follows. Suppose that the seller is the sole owner (A-
ownership). Even if no agreement is reached, the seller can make a positive profit (say, α). Since she owns the necessary
assets, she can produce the intermediate good and use it herself to produce a final good. Yet, in the absence of the buyer's
human capital (i.e., the buyer's specific abilities to produce the final good), her profit will be smaller than the date-2 surplus
that the parties could generate together (which we denote by V). Since the buyer has no access to the necessary assets, he
makes zero profits when no agreement is reached. Next, consider sole ownership by the buyer (B-ownership). If no
agreement is reached, the buyer can produce the intermediate good himself, because he has access to the assets. Yet, the
buyer lacks the seller's specific knowledge, hence the buyer's profit (say, β) will be smaller than the surplus that the parties
could realize by collaboration. As the seller has no access to the assets, she makes zero profits. Finally, suppose that there is
joint ownership, such that each party has veto power over the use of the assets. Since no party can use the asset without the
other parties' consent, in this case the default payoffs of both parties are zero.
If the negotiation stage is reached, suppose that bargaining leads to the regular Nash bargaining solution; i.e., each party
gets its default payoff plus half of the gains from trade (where the gains from trade equal the collaboration surplus V minus
the sum of the default payoffs). At date 1, a party is willing to incur its transaction costs only if they are smaller than half of
the gains from trade. Clearly, if the transaction costs are so large that negotiations will never occur, the optimal ownership
structure is the one that leads to the largest sum of the default payoffs. Without loss of generality, let us suppose that α4β,
such that A-ownership is the uniquely optimal ownership structure for large transaction costs. It is now interesting to note
that for small transaction costs, B-ownership may be better than A-ownership, and joint ownership may be uniquely
optimal. The reason is that the gains from trade are larger in the case of B-ownership (and even more so in the case of joint
ownership) than they are in the case of A-ownership, so the parties are actually least inclined to pay their transaction costs
in the case of A-ownership. Specifically, the optimality of B-ownership or joint ownership requires that (in the wording of
Anderlini and Felli, 2006) there is a ‘mismatch’ between the distribution of the surplus (50:50 in the case of the regular Nash
bargaining solution) and the distribution of the transaction costs (i.e., the two parties must have different transaction
costs).3 Yet, such a ‘mismatch’ is not a prerequisite for the optimality of B-ownership or joint ownership once we allow for
investments.
In our full-fledged model, party A first can decide how much to invest in its human capital (date 0). Following the
literature on the property rights approach, we assume that the investment increases the collaboration surplus more than
party A's default payoff.4 After the investment is sunk, each party decides whether to incur its respective transaction cost
(date 1). Finally, if both parties have paid their transaction costs, negotiations take place (date 2). In the standard property
rights model (i.e., if there were no transaction costs), A-ownership would be the uniquely optimal ownership structure, as it
would maximize party A's incentives to invest. Yet, we will show that in the presence of transaction costs, party A's
investment may well be larger under B-ownership and under joint ownership. Intuitively, the fact that B-ownership and in
particular joint ownership are so unattractive when no agreement is reached implies that paying the transaction costs may
be an equilibrium outcome under these ownership structures, even when under A-ownership the negotiation phase would
not be reached. Hence, B-ownership and joint ownership may prevent ex post inefficiencies and provide stronger2 As discussed in detail by Anderlini and Felli (2006), the transaction costs may be interpreted as the time spent ‘preparing’ for the negotiations. For
instance, the parties need to conceive of a suitable language to describe the states of nature, they must collect information about the legal environment,
they need to spend time arranging a way to meet, etc.
3 The reason is that when both parties have the same transaction costs, under A-ownership both parties can recoup their transaction costs whenever
their sum is smaller than Vα; i.e., whenever reaching an agreement is efficient. Thus, B-ownership or joint ownership cannot be strictly better than A-
ownership, because A-ownership already yields the largest attainable total surplus, regardless of whether or not an agreement is reached.
4 Specifically, the collaboration surplus now is V  ð1þ IÞ, while party A's default payoff under A-ownership is α  ð1þ IÞ, where I is the investment level
chosen by party A.
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ownership, and joint ownership may turn out to be the uniquely optimal ownership structure.
Empirically, our finding that joint ownership can be uniquely optimal in sustainable relationships when transaction costs
are relatively high is in line with the observation that joint ventures are particularly prevalent in the context of complex R&D
activities.5 For instance, in the empirical literature Pisano (1989) reports that firms are more likely to form equity joint
ventures when R&D has to be performed in the course of their collaboration (as opposed to other functions such as
manufacturing or marketing). Oxley and Sampson (2004) also point out that joint ventures are often observed when alliance
objectives require partners to share complex and/or tacit knowledge, especially in technologically innovative projects. Under
such circumstances transaction costs are likely to be larger than in more standard situations, where the usual conclusions of
the property rights theory hold.6
Related literature: Inspired by Coase's (1937) famous article on the nature of the firm, the property rights approach has
been devised in the seminal papers by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990), and was synthesized by Hart
(1995). The by now standard property rights models have recently been criticized by Tadelis and Williamson (2012) for
being too focused on ex ante investment incentives, while in practice mitigating ex post inefficiencies may also be an
important role of governance structures. In our model, we explicitly take transaction costs into account and explore the
implications of the different ownership structures on the ex post negotiations.7 Hence, our contribution may help us to
somewhat broaden the bridge between the property rights approach and traditional transaction costs economics.8
We model transaction costs following Anderlini and Felli (2006).9 While they do not study ex ante investments, in
Section 5 of their paper they also briefly consider the role of property rights. Yet, their model differs from the standard
property rights approach to the theory of the firm and they focus their attention on a specific range of parameters (see our
detailed discussion at the end of Section 2). Thus, in their framework they find that the ownership structure which leads to
the largest sum of the default payoffs (i.e., A-ownership in our setup) is always optimal, provided that the negotiations are
modeled by the Nash bargaining solution in the usual way.10
The property rights approach has also been criticized because the standard model cannot explain joint ownership. For
instance, Holmström (1999) has emphasized that joint ventures have always been an important part of the corporate
landscape, and that thus the prediction of the standard property rights model according to which joint ownership is never
optimal seems to be counterfactual. Our paper adds to the literature that looks for possible explanations of joint ownership
within the property rights paradigm.11 In particular, the intuition behind our results is somewhat related to Halonen
(2002).12 She considers an infinitely repeated game and argues that joint ownership can be desirable as it may help us to
sustain cooperative behavior. Specifically, the fact that joint ownership is suboptimal in a one-shot setting means that it can
aggravate punishments for deviations from cooperative behavior (which trigger reversion to the stage-game equilibrium). In
contrast, we stay within the usual one-shot setup of the property rights theory and in our model the fact that joint own-
ership leads to unattractive default payoffs is turned to an advantage because larger gains from trade increase the parties'
willingness to incur the transaction costs.
Organization of the paper: The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the basic model without
investments is introduced. In Section 3, our main results are derived in a property rights model with non-contractible
investment. Concluding remarks follow in Section 4. All formal proofs have been relegated to the Appendix.5 For an empirical study that confirms the close relationship between the notion of joint ownership in the property rights theory and characteristics of
joint ventures in practice, see Gattai and Natale (2013).
6 See also Oxley (1997), who finds that equity joint ventures are more likely to be observed in the case of product or process design than in the case of
production or marketing activities. Emphasizing the substantial investments in the exploration of new technologies and processes, Sampson (2004) also
highlights the role of high transaction costs in the context of complex R&D activities (see also Croisier, 1998).
7 While explicit transaction costs might be the most straightforward way to allow for ex post inefficiencies, there are of course alternatives. For
example, Schmitz (2006) and Goldlücke and Schmitz (2014) assume that an agent's default payoff is better known to herself than to the other party, such
that negotiations may fail due to asymmetric information. Hart and Moore (2008) and Hart (2009) introduce behavioral assumptions according to which an
agent may engage in inefficient shading activities when she is aggrieved (which happens when she does not get what she feels entitled to). See also
Herweg and Schmidt (2015) for a model with inefficient renegotiation based on loss aversion.
8 On the relation between the property rights theory and traditional transaction costs economics, see also Holmström and Roberts (1998), Williamson
(2002), and Whinston (2003).
9 For more general definitions of transaction costs, see Malin and Martimort (2002).
10 In the property rights approach to the theory of the firm, the parties' default payoffs are usually considered to constitute the threatpoint of the Nash
bargaining solution (i.e., the surplus is divided according to the split-the-difference rule). De Meza and Lockwood (1998) and Chiu (1998) consider an
alternative way to model the negotiations (the deal-me-out solution, where the default payoffs act as a constraint on the bargaining set). For non-
cooperative foundations of the alternative bargaining outcomes, see e.g. Chiu and Yang (1999) and the textbook by Muthoo (1999).
11 Other explanations of joint ownership include investments in physical capital (Hart, 1995, pp. 68–69), multidimensional investments (Cai, 2003, and
Rosenkranz and Schmitz, 2003), and asymmetric information (Schmitz, 2008). See also Gattai and Natale (2015) for a recent literature review.
12 See also the related work on repeated games by Baker et al. (2002) and Halonen-Akatwijuka and Pafilis (2009).
Table 1
The parties' default payoffs.
dA
o
dB
o
o¼A α 0
o¼B 0 β
o¼ J 0 0
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There are two agents, A and B, who at some future date t¼2 can agree to collaborate in order to generate a surplus of size
V40. In case of negotiations not taking place or no agreement being reached, at date t¼2 each party iAfA;Bg obtains only
its default payoff doi Z0, where oAfA;B; Jg denotes the ownership structure. The ownership structure specifies either agent i
to be the owner, o¼ iAfA;Bg, or joint ownership, o¼ J. In line with the property rights approach to the theory of the firm, we
assume that in the case of sole ownership by party A or party B, the owner's default payoff is positive but smaller than V,
while the non-owner's default payoff is zero. In the case of joint ownership, each party has veto power such that both
parties' default payoffs are zero.13 The parties' default payoffs under the different ownership structures are summarized in
Table 1.14 We assume that V4α4β40.
In case of negotiations taking place and an agreement being reached, the value V is generated. The division of this value
between the two agents is determined according to the generalized Nash bargaining solution, where λA ½0;1 and 1λ
denote agent A's and agent B's bargaining power, respectively. Specifically, suppose that agent B obtains the full value V.
Then the transfer T paid from agent B to agent A solves15
max
T
ðTdoAÞλðVTdoBÞ1λ:
In consequence, if negotiations lead to an agreement, agent A's payoff is
T ¼ doAþλðVdoAdoBÞ
and agent B's payoff is
VT ¼ doBþð1λÞðVdoAdoBÞ:
Thus, each agent receives her default payoff plus a share of the gains from trade (i.e., the available surplus over and above
the sum of the default payoffs).
For negotiations to take place, however, at date t¼1 each agent iAfA;Bg has to pay a transaction cost ci40. The agents
reach the negotiation stage only if both agents pay their respective transaction costs. We thus model transaction costs in the
same way as Anderlini and Felli (2006).
To summarize, the two agents engage in the following two-stage game. At date t¼1, the agents simultaneously and non-
cooperatively decide whether to pay the transaction cost cA and cB. At date t¼2, if both agents have paid their respective
transaction costs, the agents can negotiate an agreement that yields a value of V. If an agreement is reached, agent B obtains
value V and pays transfer T to agent A. If no agreement is reached at date t¼2 or if at least one agent did not pay her
transaction cost at date t¼1, then at date t¼2 agent i receives her default payoff dio. The solution concept is subgame-perfect
equilibrium in pure strategies.
Analysis of the model: Suppose that both parties have paid their transaction costs ci at date t¼1, such that negotiations
take place at date t¼2. Then an agreement will be reached and party A's payoff is doAþλðVdoAdoBÞcA, while party B's
payoff is doBþð1λÞðVdoAdoBÞcB. If at least one party does not pay the transaction costs at date t¼1, then the nego-
tiations do not take place and each party gets its default payoff at date t¼2. Hence, at date t¼1 the two agents play the
simultaneous move game shown in Fig. 1.
If an agent does not pay the transaction cost, it is the best response for the other agent also not to pay the transaction
cost. Thus, neither agent paying the transaction cost always is an equilibrium of the game. In particular, if some agent i's
transaction cost exceeds her share of the gains from trade, i.e., if cA4λðVdoAdoBÞ or cB4ð1λÞðVdoAdoBÞ, then the
aforementioned equilibrium is the unique equilibrium of the game because not paying ci is a strictly dominant strategy for
agent i. If, on the other hand, cArλðVdoAdoBÞ and cBrð1λÞðVdoAdoBÞ, then the game has a second equilibrium in
which both agents pay their transaction costs.
Whenever the equilibrium (pay cA, pay cB) exists, it Pareto-dominates the equilibrium (don't pay cA, don't pay cB); i.e., each
agent's payoff in the former equilibrium weakly exceeds her default payoff and (except for the knife-edge case where13 We thus define joint ownership in the same way as it is usually done in the literature on the property rights approach (see Hart, 1995).
14 In the Supplementary Material we illustrate that similar insights can also be gained in frameworks with ownership structures in which a party may
own only a subset of the assets, so the party has to trade with alternative partners on the market (possibly requiring further transaction costs) when no
agreement is reached.
15 For a comprehensive exposition of bargaining theory, see Muthoo (1999).
Fig. 1. The normal-form game played at date t¼1. Agent A chooses a row, while agent B chooses a column. In each cell, agent A's payoff is displayed above
agent B's payoff.
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that under such circumstances, agents coordinate on the Pareto-superior equilibrium. Thus, whenever it exists, we assume
that the equilibrium (pay cA, pay cB) is played.
In particular, in line with Anderlini and Felli (2006), in the remainder of the paper we suppose that the agents coordinate
on Pareto-perfect equilibria; i.e., we require that in every subgame an equilibrium is played which is not strictly Pareto-
dominated by any other equilibrium of the same subgame.16
Let the total surplus generated under a given ownership structure be denoted by S(o). Whenever the equilibrium (pay cA,
pay cB) is played, the total surplus equals the net surplus from reaching an agreement, VcAcB. If, however, for a given
ownership structure the equilibrium (don't pay cA, don't pay cB) is the unique equilibrium, then the total surplus equals the
sum of the agents' default payoffs in that ownership structure.
Lemma 1. Consider ownership structure oAfA;B; Jg.
(i) If cArλðVdoAdoBÞ and cBrð1λÞðVdoAdoBÞ, then SðoÞ ¼ VcAcB.
(ii) If cA4λðVdoAdoBÞ or cB4 ð1λÞðVdoAdoBÞ, then SðoÞ ¼ doAþdoB.
An optimal ownership structure o maximizes the total surplus generated; i.e., oAO ≔ arg maxoA fA;B;JgSðoÞ.
With α4β, the sum of the default payoffs is maximized under A-ownership and in this case equals α. Therefore,
whenever VcAcBoα, A-ownership is optimal, which results in the equilibrium (don't pay cA, don't pay cB) and thus payoff
di
A
for agent iAfA;Bg.
If VcAcBZα, then the total surplus would be maximized if each agent pays her respective transaction cost and
negotiations take place, in which case an agreement is reached. An agent is willing to incur the transaction cost, however,
only if her share of the gains from trade (i.e., the value from agreement minus the sum of default payoffs) exceeds her
transaction cost. Noting that the gains from trade are minimal under A-ownership and maximal under joint ownership leads
to the following characterization of the optimal ownership structure.
Proposition 1.
(i) Suppose that VcAcBoα. Then O¼ fAg.
(ii) Suppose that VcAcB4α.
(a) If cArλðVαÞ and cBrð1λÞðVαÞ, then O¼ fA;B; Jg.
(b) If λðVαÞocArλðVβÞ or ð1λÞðVαÞocBr ð1λÞðVβÞ, then O¼ fB; Jg.
(c) If λðVβÞocArλV or ð1λÞðVβÞocBrð1λÞV , then O¼ fJg.
(d) If λVocA or ð1λÞVocB, then O¼ fAg.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Let us take a closer look at part (ii) of Proposition 1. Note that any ownership structure that leads to both agents paying
the transaction costs and thus the maximum surplus VcAcB to be generated is optimal. If the gains from trade are too
small even under joint ownership for one of the agents to recoup her transaction cost, case (d), then this agent will never be
willing to pay her transaction cost irrespective of the ownership structure. With negotiations not taking place under any
ownership structure, the optimal ownership structure maximizes the sum of the agents' default payoffs. Hence, A-own-
ership is optimal.
If, on the other hand, both agents can recoup their respective transaction costs even under A-ownership where gains
from trade are minimal, case (a), then both agents can recoup the transaction cost also under any other ownership structure.
Hence, negotiations will take place and the maximum surplus will be achieved irrespective of the ownership structure, such
that all ownership structures are equally efficient.
Regarding cases (b) and (c), from VcAcB4α it follows that if agent i cannot recoup her transaction cost ci under some
specific ownership structure ~o, then agent ja i can recoup her transaction cost cj under ownership structure ~o and any16 For a detailed discussion of Pareto perfection, see Bernheim et al. (1987) and Benoît and Krishna (1993). Alternatively, as has also been pointed out
by Anderlini and Felli (2006), we could modify the timing such that the parties have to pay their transaction costs sequentially (in this case there would be
no multiplicity of equilibria and the same results would be obtained as under Pareto perfection).
Fig. 2. Optimal ownership structures.
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under A-ownership but under B-ownership (and thus also under joint ownership), case (b), then both B-ownership and joint
ownership achieve the maximum surplus and thus are optimal. Likewise, if some agent cannot cover her transaction cost
under B-ownership (and thus also not under A-ownership) but under joint ownership, case (c), then only joint ownership
achieves the maximum surplus and thus is the uniquely optimal ownership structure.
Proposition 1 is illustrated in Fig. 2.17 Consider the case in which it would be efficient for the parties to reach an
agreement, such that cB lies below the curve VαcA. Anderlini and Felli (2006) have pointed out that if the distribution of
the transaction costs is sufficiently ‘mis-matched’ with the distribution of the surplus (in Fig. 2, this is the case when
cB4 ð1λÞV and thus cAoλVα), then negotiations do not take place and the optimal ownership structure maximizes the
sum of the default payoffs (in our case, this means that A-ownership is optimal).18 Yet, what is important to observe is the
fact that the ownership structure also matters if cB is smaller than ð1λÞV , which has not been studied by Anderlini and Felli
(2006). In particular, it is interesting to note that then there are parameter regions where A-ownership is strictly worse than
o¼B and o¼ J. Intuitively, the gains from trade are larger under o¼B than under o¼A. Hence, the parties are more inclined to
incur the transaction costs under B-ownership than under A-ownership. Analogously, the parties are even more willing to
incur the transaction costs under joint ownership. For this reason, o¼ J may be the uniquely optimal ownership structure.
Note that in order for A-ownership to be strictly dominated by o¼B or o¼ J, we need a ‘mismatch’ between the dis-
tribution of the transaction costs (cA, cB) and the distribution of the surplus which is determined by the parties' bargaining
powers (λ, 1λ). In the symmetric case where cA ¼ cB≕c and λ¼ 1=2, Proposition 1(i) implies that A-ownership is optimal
for V2coα, while Proposition 1(ii)(a) implies that all ownership structures are optimal for V2c4α.19 Thus, in the
symmetric case, A-ownership is always optimal.
Corollary 1. Suppose that λ¼ 1=2 and cA ¼ cB. Then AAO.
In contrast, in the following section we will demonstrate that even in the symmetric case the presence of transaction
costs can have interesting implications for the (sub-)optimality of A-ownership when we take incentives to make non-
contractible investments into account.3. Transaction costs and investment incentives
We now consider a full-fledged property rights model with an ex ante investment stage and explore the implications that
the introduction of transaction costs has for the optimal ownership structure. Specifically, let us consider the following
extension of our basic model.
Suppose that at date t¼0 agent A can make a non-contractible investment IZ0 at cost K(I), where Kð0Þ ¼ K 0ð0Þ ¼ 0, K 040
for I40, K″40, K‴Z0, and limI-1 K
0ðIÞ ¼1. In line with the property rights approach (cf. Hart, 1995), agent A can invest in17 In the figure, we depict the case where maxfðVαÞ=V ;α=VgoλoðVαÞ=ðVβÞ.
18 Anderlini and Felli (2006) assume that the default payoffs can be freely chosen, provided that they add up to zero. This is somewhat unusual in the
property rights approach, where typically an exogenous set of ownership structures is considered. Note that if default payoffs could indeed be negative and
freely chosen without the restriction of adding up to zero, the parties could always ensure that negotiations take place and an agreement is reached.
19 It is straightforward to see that O¼ fA;B; Jg must also hold in the knife-edge case V2c¼α.
Table 2
The parties' default payoffs with ex ante investment.
doAðIÞ dB
o
o¼A αð1þ IÞ 0
o¼B 0 β
o¼ J 0 0
D. Müller, P.W. Schmitz / European Economic Review 87 (2016) 92–10798her human capital. Thus, the effect of the investment is twofold. First, the investment affects the value generated in case of
both agents paying the transaction costs and reaching an agreement; i.e., the date-2 surplus in case of collaboration is now
given by V  ð1þ IÞ. Second, the investment also affects agent A's default payoff in case of A-ownership. Formally, dAAðIÞ ¼ α 
ð1þ IÞ and dBA ¼ dJA ¼ 0, where we still assume that 0oαoV . Thus, in case agent A does not invest at all, i.e., for I¼0, the
value from cooperation and agent A's default payoff equal V and α, respectively, just as in the baseline model without ex ante
investment. Agent B's default payoff is unaffected by agent A's investment in her human capital; i.e., dAB ¼ dJB ¼ 0oβ¼ dBB.
The default payoffs are summarized in Table 2.
As before, we assume that βoα, which ensures that if no agreement is reached, o¼Amaximizes the date-2 total surplus,
regardless of the investment level. Moreover, in order to simplify the exposition we also assume that V42α, which means
that agent A making the investment leads to a sufficiently large increase in the value of reaching an agreement relative to
the increase in agent A's default payoff. As will become clear below, we thus restrict our attention to the most interesting
cases with regard to the optimal ownership structure.
In accordance with the property rights approach, the investment decision of agent A becomes observable for agent B
between dates t¼0 and t¼1.20 Thereafter, events unfold as in the baseline model. Thus, at date t¼1 both agents simul-
taneously and non-cooperatively decide whether to pay their respective transaction costs; if both agents have paid their
transactions costs, then at date t¼2 negotiations take place.
In the absence of transaction costs (cA ¼ cB ¼ 0), we have a standard property rights model in the tradition of Grossman
and Hart (1986), in which o¼A is the uniquely optimal ownership structure (since agreement is always reached and
investment incentives are maximized when agent A's default payoff in the negotiations is as large as possible).21
In the remainder of the paper, following most of the literature on the property rights approach,22 we assume that the
negotiations lead to the regular Nash bargaining solution; i.e., both parties have the same bargaining power, λ¼ 1=2.
Moreover, we also assume that both parties have the same transaction costs, cA ¼ cB≕c. Hence, in the wording of Anderlini
and Felli (2006), the distribution of the transaction costs is not ‘mis-matched’with the distribution of the surplus. Recall that
in the baseline model without investment (I 0), A-ownership is always optimal in this symmetric case (see Corollary 1).23
Hence, we have stacked the deck in favor of A-ownership. If either the transaction costs are zero or there is no
investment decision to be made, then A-ownership is optimal. As a consequence, when we will find that o¼B or o¼ J is
strictly better than o¼A, then this result must follow from the interplay of the transaction costs with the investment
decision.
3.1. Investment incentives
Consider ownership structure oAfA;B; Jg. Suppose that agent A has invested amount IZ0 at date t¼0. In analogy to the
baseline model, it is straightforward to see that at date t¼1 both agents paying the transaction cost c is an equilibrium if and
only if cr12 V 1þ Ið Þd
o
A Ið ÞdoB
 
or, equivalently, if and only if agent A's investment is sufficiently high,
IZ ~I
o
≔
2cþdoB
VIoα1;
where Io is an indicator function with
Io ¼
1 if o¼ A;
0 if oAfB; Jg:
(
ð1Þ
Thus, if agent A invests below ~I
o
, then neither agent will pay the transaction costs and agent A's utility equals her default
payoff minus the investment cost,
uoAðIÞ≔Ioð1þ IÞαKðIÞ:
If, on the other hand, agent A's investment exceeds ~I
o
, then both agents will pay the transaction costs and agent A's utility20 In the Supplementary Material we illustrate that our main insights can also be obtained in a model where party B can observe party A's investment
only after party B has incurred its transaction costs cB.
21 The formal proof of this result is a special case of our analysis below.
22 See e.g. the seminal work by Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart (1995), and Hart et al. (1997).
23 It is straightforward to extend our analysis to the case of asymmetric bargaining powers. In the Supplementary Material we show that then joint
ownership can yield a larger total surplus than A-ownership even when the transaction costs are small.
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uoAðIÞ≔12 1þ Ið Þ VþIoα
 doB cK Ið Þ:
Define
I
o
≔arg max
IZ0
uoA Ið Þ ¼ϕ
VþIoα
2
 
and Io≔arg max
IZ0
uoA Ið Þ ¼ϕ Ioα
 
;
where ϕðÞ  K 01ðÞ denotes the inverse of the marginal investment cost function K 0ðÞ. One can show that agent A's
maximum utility when both agents pay the transaction costs exceeds her maximum utility when neither agent pays the
transaction costs if and only if the transaction costs are sufficiently small; i.e., there exists ~co such that uoAðI
oÞ⋛uoAðI
oÞ if and
only if c⋚~co. Furthermore, it can be shown that co ~co implies Io4 ~Io and that c4 ~co implies Ioo ~Io. Thus, agent A's
investment behavior under ownership structure oAfA;B; Jg can be characterized as follows.
Lemma 2. For oAfA;B; Jg, there exists a threshold ~co such that agent A's optimal level of investment is given by
Io ¼
ϕ
VþIoα
2
 
if cr ~co;
ϕ Ioαð Þ if c4 ~co:
8><
>:
Proof. See the Appendix.
Note that ϕð0Þ ¼ 0, such that IB ¼ IJ ¼ 0; i.e., under ownership structures o¼B and o¼ J, if agent A prefers to invest such
that transaction costs will not be paid, then he will not invest at all because his default payoff is zero under these ownership
structures.
Furthermore, note that ~cBo ~cJ must hold because, intuitively, while agent A's optimal investment is the same for o¼B
and o¼ J in case that both agents are willing to pay the transaction costs, the gains from trade generated by this investment
are strictly lower under B-ownership (because of agent B's strictly positive default payoff). In consequence, the maximum
level of transaction costs being compatible with both agents actually paying these transaction costs is higher under joint
ownership than under B-ownership.
3.2. The optimal ownership structure
Under ownership structure oAfA;B; Jg, if cr ~co, then the gains from trade given agent A's optimal investment are suf-
ficiently high for both agents to recoup their transaction costs such that the negotiations take place. If c4 ~co, on the other
hand, then the gains from trade under agent A's optimal investment are too low for both agents to recoup their respective
transaction costs such that the agents are not willing to pay these transaction costs in the first place.
From Lemma 2 it follows that when our assumptions hold then agent A's investment under an ownership structure
under which negotiations take place is always larger than under an ownership structure under which the transaction costs
are not paid, maxoA fA;B;Jg I
oominoA fA;B;Jg I
o
. Hence, Lemma 2 implies the following result.
Proposition 2.
(i) If maxf~cA; ~cBgocr ~cJ , then IBo IAo IJ .
(ii) If ~cAocr ~cB, then IAo IB ¼ IJ .
(iii) Otherwise, IBr IJo IA.
To impose somewhat more structure on the analysis of investment incentives under the alternative ownership
arrangements, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 1. Let KðIÞ ¼ψkðIÞ with ψ40, kð0Þ ¼ k0ð0Þ ¼ 0, k040 for I40, k″40, k‴Z0, and limI-1 k0ðIÞ ¼1.
The following lemma summarizes important characteristics of the thresholds ~co, which, given that Assumption 1 holds,
are continuous functions of the investment cost parameter ψ; i.e., ~co ¼ ~coðψ Þ.
Lemma 3. Suppose Assumption 1 holds.
(i) The threshold ~coðψ Þ is strictly decreasing in ψ, with limψ-1 ~coðψ Þ ¼ ðVdoAð0ÞdoBÞ=2, for each oAfA;B; Jg.
(ii) There exist critical values ~ψ AJ and ~ψ ABZ ~ψ AJ such that ψ4 ~ψ AJ ) ~cAðψ Þo ~cJðψ Þ and ψ4 ~ψ AB ) ~cAðψ Þo ~cBðψ Þ.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Part (i) of Lemma 3 says that the critical level of transaction costs above which negotiations do not take place decreases
in the investment cost parameter ψ. Intuitively, as each unit of the investment becomes more costly, agent A's optimal
investment in case that both agents subsequently pay the transaction costs decreases. Since this decrease in investment
Fig. 3. Optimal investment levels for KðIÞ ¼ ψ I2=2.
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transaction costs also decreases.
With regard to part (ii) of Lemma 3, for high values of the investment cost parameter the maximum level of transaction
costs for which negotiations take place is lowest under A-ownership. Intuitively, in this case, where investments are very
small under any ownership structure, the fact that for a given investment level the gains from trade are larger under B-
ownership and maximal under joint ownership overcompensates the stronger incentives to invest under A-ownership.
The critical thresholds ~coðψ Þ are illustrated in Fig. 3 as a function of the investment cost parameter ψ for the case of a
quadratic investment cost function.24
Recall that in the standard property rights model without transaction costs (c¼0), agent A's investment incentives can
never be larger under o¼ B or o¼ J than under A-ownership. In contrast, as illustrated in Fig. 3 and in accordance with
Proposition 2(ii), when there are positive transaction costs, then B-ownership can induce agent A to choose a larger
investment level than she would do under o¼ A. The reason is that for a given investment level the gains from trade are
larger under o¼ B than under o¼ A, such that it may happen that both agents paying the transaction costs is an equilibrium
under o¼ B but not under o¼ A. Similarly, in accordance with Proposition 2(i), it may even be the case that joint ownership
leads to a larger investment level than both o¼ A and o¼ B, because not reaching an agreement is most unattractive under
o¼ J, such that the agents may be most willing to incur the transaction costs under joint ownership.
As before, let the total surplus under ownership structure oAfA;B; Jg be denoted by SðoÞ. If the transaction costs are
sufficiently small such that in equilibrium they are incurred by both agents, then the total surplus equals the value gen-
erated by negotiation minus twice the transaction costs minus agent A's investment costs. On the other hand, if the agents
do not pay the transaction costs, then the total surplus equals the sum of the agents' default payoffs minus agent A's
investment costs. Formally,
SðoÞ ¼
Vð1þ IoÞ2cKðIoÞ if cr ~co;
doAðIoÞþdoBKðIoÞ if c4 ~co:
(
If the transaction costs are rather low and thus paid by both agents irrespective of the ownership structure, i.e. if
crminf~cA; ~cBg, then agent A's optimal investment level is strictly higher under A-ownership than under B-ownership or
joint ownership, IA4 IJ ¼ IB. Since the total surplus is a concave function of the investment level and there is always
underinvestment with regard to the first-best benchmark,25 the ownership structure that leads to the largest investment
level is optimal. In consequence, A-ownership is the uniquely optimal ownership structure in this case.
Likewise, if transaction costs are relatively high, i.e. if c4maxf~cA; ~cJg, then neither agent pays the transaction costs. While
not investing at all under B-ownership or joint ownership, agent A makes a strictly positive investment under A-ownership
because of the investment's favorable effect on her default payoff. Thus, A-ownership again provides maximum investment
incentives and therefore is the uniquely optimal ownership structure.
As we have seen, however, there may be cases in which the agents are willing to pay the transaction costs under joint
ownership (and possibly also under B-ownership) but not under A-ownership, such that agent A no longer makes the largest
investment under A-ownership. It thus stands to reason that the optimal ownership structure not necessarily gives own-
ership to the investing agent A, because joint ownership or B-ownership may avoid ex post inefficiencies and provide
stronger investment incentives. Specifically, in these cases o¼ A is suboptimal if the transaction costs (which are incurred
under o¼ B and o¼ J only) are not too large, as stated formally in the following result.24 Thus, kðIÞ ¼ 12I2. In this case, ~ψ AJ ¼ 12 V  32α
 
and ~ψ AB ¼ α ~ψ AJ= α βð Þ. Furthermore, ~cAðψ Þ⋛ ~cJ ðψ Þ if and only if ψ⋚ ~ψ AJ and ~cAðψ Þ⋛~cBðψ Þ if and only if
ψ⋚ ~ψ AB . All calculations for the case of a quadratic cost function are provided in the proof of Corollary 2.
25 The first-best investment level conditional on transaction costs being paid is given by IFB ¼ arg maxIZ0Vð1þ IÞ2cKðIÞ ¼ϕðVÞ.
Fig. 4. Optimal ownership with ex ante investment for KðIÞ ¼ ψ I2=2.
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(i) There exists a threshold ~cSðψ Þ such that for ~cAðψ Þocr ~coðψ Þ with oAfB; Jg, we have SðoÞ⋛SðAÞ ⟺ c⋚~cSðψ Þ. The threshold
~cSðψ Þ is strictly decreasing, with limψ-1 ~cSðψ Þ ¼ ðVαÞ=2.
(ii) There exists a critical value ~α40 such that for αo ~α we have ~cAðψ Þo ~cSðψ Þ.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Lemmas 3 and 4 together imply that as long as α is sufficiently small and marginal investment costs are sufficiently high,
there always exists an intermediate range of transaction costs for which A-ownership is strictly inferior to B-ownership and
joint ownership.
Proposition 3. Suppose Assumption 1 holds and that αo ~α. For oAfB; Jg, if ψ4 ~ψ Ao, we have ~cAðψ Þominf~cSðψ Þ; ~coðψ Þg and,
thus, SðoÞ4SðAÞ for cAð~cAðψ Þ;minf~cSðψ Þ; ~coðψ ÞgÞ.
Proof. See the Appendix.
For the case of a quadratic investment cost function, the optimal allocation of ownership in our model with ex ante
investment can be fully characterized as follows.
Corollary 2. Suppose Assumption 1 holds with kðIÞ ¼ 12 I2. Furthermore, suppose V4αð2þ
ffiffiffi
2
p
Þ.
(i) If maxf~cAðψ Þ; ~cBðψ Þgocominf~cJðψ Þ; ~cSðψ Þg or ~cAoc¼ ~cJo ~cS, then O¼ fJg.
(ii) If ~cAðψ Þocominf~cBðψ Þ; ~cSðψ Þg or ~cAoc¼ ~cBo ~cS, then O¼ fB; Jg.
(iii) Otherwise, AAO.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Corollary 2 is illustrated in Fig. 4. In the standard property rights model without transaction costs (c¼0), A-ownership
must be optimal, because agreement is always reached and agent A's incentives to invest are larger under o¼ A than under
o¼ B or o¼ J. Yet, when there are positive transaction costs, then ownership by the non-investing party B may be better
than A-ownership. Moreover, joint ownership may be the uniquely optimal ownership structure.
Specifically, if the transaction costs are sufficiently low such that they will be paid under A-ownership, cr ~cAðψ Þ, then A-
ownership also provides maximum investment incentives, I
A
4maxfI J ; IB; I J ; IBg, and is the uniquely optimal ownership
structure. Moreover, if the transaction costs are so high such that they will not be paid irrespective of the ownership
structure, c4maxf~cAðψ Þ; ~cJðψ Þg, then A-ownership again provides the highest investment incentives, IA4 I J ¼ IB, and is thus
the uniquely optimal ownership structure.
However, as can be seen in Fig. 4, there are parameter constellations where the transaction costs are paid (i.e., the
relationship is sustained) only under joint ownership, maxf~cAðψ Þ; ~cBðψ Þgocr ~cJðψ Þ. Furthermore, there are parameter
constellations where the transaction costs are paid under joint ownership and under B-ownership, but not under A-own-
ership, ~cAðψ Þocr ~cBðψ Þ. In the former case, joint ownership provides maximum investment incentives, while in the latter
case both joint ownership and B-ownership provide maximum investment incentives, since I
J ¼ IB4 IA4 IB. These higher
investments translate into higher surplus levels only if the transaction costs are not too high, i.e., for co ~cSðψ Þ. Hence, the
optimal ownership structures are as displayed in Fig. 4.
Intuitively, what makes joint ownership so unattractive in standard property rights models is the fact that when no
agreement is reached, each party has veto power so that no surplus is realized. It is precisely this property of joint own-
ership that can make it attractive in the case of positive transaction costs, because the parties will be more inclined to pay
the transaction costs when failing to do so leads to a very undesirable outcome. Since an ex post agreement may thus be
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and turn out to be the optimal ownership structure.4. Conclusion
In the past three decades, the property rights approach to the theory of the firm, pioneered by Grossman and Hart (1986),
Hart and Moore (1990), and Hart (1995), has become a leading paradigm in institutional and organizational economics.
While the property rights approach is sometimes regarded as a formalization of transaction costs economics, its main focus
has been on ex ante non-contractible investments, while ex post negotiations are assumed to be without frictions. In the
present paper, we have introduced explicit transaction costs in the negotiation stage. It has turned out that the straight-
forward formalization of transaction costs as proposed by Anderlini and Felli (2006) is very useful to enrich the standard
property rights model. Even when we keep the standard assumption of equal bargaining powers and assume that both
parties have the same transaction costs (such that in the absence of investment decisions, the ownership structure that
maximizes the sum of the parties' default payoffs is always optimal), prominent conclusions of the property rights theory
may be overturned. In particular, depending on the magnitude of the transaction costs, ownership by a non-investing party
and joint ownership can be optimal. The reason that ownership structures which are suboptimal in standard property rights
models can turn out to be optimal in our setup is the fact that under these ownership structures the ex post gains from trade
are particularly large, which increases the willingness of the parties to incur the transaction costs in the first place.
While Anderlini and Felli's (2006) concise way of modeling transaction costs fits in nicely with the usual property rights
framework that makes use of the Nash bargaining solution, in future research it might also be interesting to explore the role
of ownership and transaction costs when the negotiations are modelled by a non-cooperative bargaining game. Specifically,
Anderlini and Felli (2001) have introduced transaction costs in an alternating offers bargaining model, and it could be
worthwhile to study the implications of different property rights allocations in their setup. Moreover, in the present paper
we followed the standard property rights approach by assuming that the parties are symmetrically informed. In future
research, we plan to study the role that private information about transaction costs might play.
Finally, while we have shown that the presence of transaction costs can overturn some of the most prominent con-
clusions of the property rights approach, we would like to emphasize that our findings are in support of what one might
consider to be the main insight of the theory developed by Oliver Hart and his coauthors: Ownership matters. Given that in
practice model parameters such as the magnitude of transaction costs may be constantly changing, the property rights
theory is indeed well in line with the observation that firms “are continually merging and demerging, outsourcing and
insourcing” as has been pointed out by Hart (2011, p. 104).Acknowledgments
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cArλðVdAAdABÞ and cBr ð1λÞðVdAAdABÞ are satisfied, because this would imply cAþcBrVdAAdAB ¼ Vα. Thus, at
least one of the parties does not pay the transaction costs and SðAÞ ¼ α (see Lemma 1). Since α4maxfβ;VcAcBg,
ownership by agent A leads to a surplus that is strictly larger than the surplus levels that may be attained under any other
ownership structure. Hence, O¼ fAg.
(ii) Suppose that VcAcB4α holds.
(a) If cArλðVαÞ and cBrð1λÞðVαÞ, then both conditions cArλðVdoAdoBÞ and cBr ð1λÞðVdoAdoBÞ are satisfied for
all oAfA;B; Jg. Thus, both parties pay the transaction costs and the total surplus is VcAcB under each ownership
structure (see Lemma 1). Hence, O¼ fA;B; Jg.
(b) Suppose λðVαÞocArλðVβÞ. In this case, cBoVαcAoð1λÞðVαÞ must be true. Party A does not pay the
transaction costs under A-ownership since cA4λðVdAAdABÞ, hence SðAÞ ¼ α. However, cArλðVdoAdoBÞ and
cBoð1λÞðVdoAdoBÞ hold for oAfB; Jg, so both parties pay the transaction costs under B-ownership and joint own-
ership. Therefore, SðBÞ ¼ SðJÞ ¼ VcAcB and O¼ fB; Jg. Analogous arguments can be made in the case
ð1λÞðVαÞocBrð1λÞðVβÞ.
(c) Suppose λðVβÞocArλV . In this case, cBoVαcAo ð1λÞV must hold. Observe that cA4λðVdoAdoBÞ for oAfA;Bg,
hence party A does not pay the transaction costs under these ownership structures. Thus, SðAÞ ¼ α and SðBÞ ¼ β. Yet, both
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J
BÞ and cBrð1λÞðVdJAd
J
BÞ.
As a consequence, SðJÞ ¼ VcAcB and hence O¼ fJg. Analogous arguments can be made in the case
ð1λÞðVβÞocBrð1λÞV .
(d) If λVocA, then party A will not pay the transaction costs regardless of the ownership structure, because
cA4λðVdoAdoBÞ for all oAfA;B; Jg. Similarly, if ð1λÞVocB, then party B will not pay the transaction costs. Hence,
SðAÞ ¼ α, SðBÞ ¼ β, and SðJÞ ¼ 0. As a result, O¼ fAg.□
Proof of Lemma 2. A-ownership. With IA ¼ 1, we have uAA Ið Þ ¼ 12 1þ Ið Þ Vþαð ÞcK Ið Þ and uAAðIÞ ¼ ð1þ IÞαKðIÞ.
Both uAAðIÞ and uAAðIÞ are strictly concave functions of agent A's investment I; i.e., ∂2u
A
AðIÞ=∂I2 ¼ ∂2uAAðIÞ=∂I
2 ¼ K″ðIÞo0. Fur-
thermore, the slope of uAAðIÞ is strictly larger than the slope of uAAðIÞ for each investment level; i.e.,
∂uAA Ið Þ=∂I ¼ V þα2 K 0 Ið Þ4αK 0 Ið Þ ¼ ∂uAA Ið Þ=∂I. With ∂uAAðIÞ=∂IjI ¼ 040, the level of investment I
A that globally maximizes uAAðIÞ
is determined by the first-order condition ∂uAAðI
AÞ=∂I¼ 0 and is given by
K 0ðIAÞ ¼ α ⟺ IA ¼ϕ αð Þ: ð2Þ
Likewise, the level of investment I
A
that globally maximizes uAAðIÞ is determined by the first-order condition ∂uAAðI
AÞ=∂I¼ 0
and is given by
K ' I
A
	 

¼ Vþα
2
⟺ I
A ¼ ϕ Vþα
2
 
: ð3Þ
Note that I
A
4 IA as ϕ040.
First, suppose that crV α2 . In this case, ~I
A
≔ 2cVα1r0 such that—as outlined in the text—both agents are willing to pay
the transaction costs irrespective of agent A's investment. Hence, agent A chooses his investment to maximize uAAðIÞ; i.e., for
crV α2 , agent A's optimal investment is I
A ¼ IA.
Next, suppose that c4V α2 , such that
~I
A
40. As outlined in the text, both agents pay the transaction cost c if IZ ~I
A
. If Io ~IA,
on the other hand, neither agent pays the transaction cost c. Observe that
uAA I
A
	 

⋛uAA I
A
	 

⟺ c⋚ c
 A
≔
V  α
2
þΓ Vþα
2
 
 Γ αð Þ; ð4Þ
where ΓðxÞ ϕðxÞxKðϕðxÞÞ with Γ0ðxÞ ¼ϕðxÞ40. Furthermore,
~I
A
4 IA ⟺ c4cA≔
Vα
2
þVα
2
ϕ αð Þ ð5Þ
and
~I
Ao IA ⟺ cocA≔Vα
2
þVα
2
ϕ
Vþα
2
 
: ð6Þ
Comparison of cA and ~cA reveals that
cAo ~cA ⟺ Vþα
2
4
KðIAÞKðIAÞ
I
A IA
; ð7Þ
where the latter inequality holds by strict convexity of KðÞ together with K 0 IA
	 

¼ Vþα2 . Likewise, comparison of cA and ~c
A
shows that
cA4 ~cA ⟺ αo KðI
AÞKðIAÞ
I
A IA
; ð8Þ
where the latter inequality holds by strict convexity of KðÞ together with K 0ðIAÞ ¼ α. Thus, cAo ~cAocA. Hence, if cr ~cA and
agent A invests I
A
, then I
A
4 ~I
A
such that both agents pay the transaction cost and agent A obtains his largest possible utility
uAAðI
AÞ. If c4 ~cA and agent A invests IA, then IAo ~IA such that neither agent pays the transaction cost and agent A obtains his
largest possible utility uAAðI
AÞ. Overall, agent A's optimal investment is IA ¼ IA if V α2 ocr ~c
A and IA ¼ IA if c4 ~cA.
B-ownership: With IA ¼ 0, we have uBA Ið Þ ¼ 12 1þ Ið ÞVβ
 cK Ið Þ and uBAðIÞ ¼ KðIÞ. Both uBAðIÞ and uBAðIÞ are strictly con-
cave functions of agent A's investment I. Furthermore, the slope of uBAðIÞ is larger for each investment level than the slope of
uBAðIÞ. With ∂uBAðIÞ=∂IjI ¼ 0 ¼ 0, the level of investment I
B that globally maximizes uBAðIÞ is equal to zero, I
B ¼ 0. The level of
investment I
B
that globally maximizes uBAðIÞ, on the other hand, is strictly positive and determined by the first-order
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BÞ=∂I¼ 0. Hence,
K ' I
B
	 

¼ V
2
⟺ I
B ¼ ϕ V
2
 
: ð9Þ
First, suppose that crV β2 . In this case, ~I
B
≔2cþβV 1r0 such that both agents are willing to pay the transaction cost
irrespective of agent A's investment. Hence, agent A maximizes uBAðIÞ; i.e., for crVβ2 , agent A's optimal investment is IB ¼ I
B
.
Next, suppose that c4V β2 , such that
~I
B
40. As outlined in the text, both agents pay the transaction cost c if IZ ~I
B
. If Io ~IB,
on the other hand, neither agent pays the transaction cost c. Observe that
uBA I
B
	 

⋛uBA I
B
	 

⟺ c⋚ c
 B
≔
V  β
2
þΓ V
2
 
: ð10Þ
Furthermore,
~I
B
4 IB ⟺ c4cB≔
Vβ
2
ð11Þ
and
~I
Bo IB ⟺ cocB≔Vβ
2
þV
2
ϕ
V
2
 
: ð12Þ
Comparison of cB and ~cB reveals that
cB4 ~cB ⟺ KðIBÞo0: ð13Þ
Likewise, comparison of cB and ~cB shows that
cBo c B ⟺ Γ V
2
 
¼ V
2
I
B  K IB
	 

40; ð14Þ
where the last inequality holds because I
B ¼ arg maxIZ0 V2IK Ið Þ and Kð0Þ ¼ 0. Thus, cBo ~c
BocB. Hence, if cr ~cB and agent A
invests I
B
, then I
B
4 ~I
B
such that both agents pay the transaction cost and agent A obtains his largest possible utility uBAðI
BÞ.
If c4 ~cB and agent A invests IB, then IBo ~IB such that neither agent pays the transaction cost and agent A obtains his largest
possible utility uBAðI
BÞ. Overall, agent A's optimal investment is IB ¼ IB if V β2 ocr ~c
B and IB ¼ IB if c4 ~cB.
Joint ownership: The proof for o¼ J follows in analogy to the proof for o¼B, with β 0. Note that ~cJ≔V2þΓ V2
 
, which,
compared to (10), reveals that ~cJ4 ~cB.□
Proof of Lemma 3. (i) Denote by θðÞ ¼ k01ðÞ the inverse function of k' ð Þ, where θð0Þ ¼ 0, θ040 and θ″r0. Then
ϕ xð Þ ¼ K 01 xð Þ ¼ θ xψ
	 

. Differentiation of the threshold
~cA ψ
 ¼ Vα
2
þ θ Vþα
2ψ
 
Vþα
2
ψk θ Vþα
2ψ
   
 θ α
ψ
 
αψk θ α
ψ
   
ð15Þ
with respect to ψ yields
d~cAðψ Þ
dψ
¼  k θ Vþα
2ψ
  
k θ α
ψ
   
o0; ð16Þ
where we made use of the fact that k0ðθðxÞÞ ¼ x. Similarly, differentiation of
~cB ψ
 ¼ Vβ
2
þθ V
2ψ
 
V
2
ψk θ V
2ψ
  
ð17Þ
and
~cJ ψ
 ¼ V
2
þθ V
2ψ
 
V
2
ψk θ V
2ψ
  
ð18Þ
yields
d~cBðψ Þ
dψ
¼ d~c
Jðψ Þ
dψ
¼ k θ V
2ψ
  
o0: ð19Þ
The statement regarding the respective limit of the thresholds ~cAðψ Þ, ~cBðψ Þ, and ~cJðψ Þ as ψ-1 follows from (15), (17), and
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ψk θ
z
ψ
  
¼
k θ
z
ψ
  
1
ψ
; ð20Þ
application of L'Hôpital's rule yields
lim
ψ-1
ψk θ
z
ψ
  
¼ lim
ψ-1
z
ψ
θ0
z
ψ
 
 z
ψ2
 
 1
ψ2
¼ lim
ψ-1
z2
ψ
θ0
z
ψ
 
¼ 0; ð21Þ
where we made use of the fact that limx-0 θ
0ðxÞ is bounded above because k″ð0Þ40 by assumption.
(ii) The existence of ~ψ AJ and ~ψ AB follows from the statement in part (i) regarding the limits of ~cAðψ Þ, ~cBðψ Þ, and ~cJðψ Þ as
ψ-1. Finally, ~ψ AJr ~ψ AB follows from ~cBðψ Þo ~cJðψ Þ.□
Proof of Lemma 4. (i) If ~cAðψ Þocr ~coðψ Þ with oAfB; Jg, then SðAÞ ¼ αð1þ IAÞKðIAÞ, whereas SðoÞ ¼ Vð1þ IoÞ2cKðIoÞ for
oAfB; Jg. Recall that IA ¼ θ αψ
	 

and I
o ¼ θ V2ψ
	 

for oAfB; Jg. It follows that SðoÞ⋛SðAÞ if and only if c⋚~cSðψ Þ, where
~cSðψ Þ≔Vα
2
þ1
2
θ
V
2ψ
 
Vψk θ V
2ψ
   
1
2
θ
α
ψ
 
αψk θ α
ψ
   
: ð22Þ
Differentiation with respect to ψ yields
d~cSðψ Þ
dψ
¼ 1
2
k θ
V
2ψ
  
k θ α
ψ
  
þθ0 V
2ψ
 
V2
4ψ2
" #
o0: ð23Þ
Finally, the statement regarding the limit of ~cSðψ Þ as ψ-1 follows from kð0Þ ¼ 0, limx-0 θðxÞ ¼ 0, and application of
L'Hôpital's rule.
(ii) With
~cAðψ Þ≔Vα
2
þΓ Vþα
2
 
Γ αð Þ ð24Þ
and
~cSðψ Þ≔Vα
2
þΓ V
2
 
þ1
2
ψk θ
V
2ψ
  
1
2
Γ αð Þ; ð25Þ
we have ~cAðψ Þo ~cSðψ Þ if and only if
1
2
ψk θ
V
2ψ
  
4Γ
Vþα
2
 
Γ V
2
 
1
2
Γ αð Þ≕Ω αð Þ: ð26Þ
Remember that ΓðxÞ ¼ϕðxÞxKðϕðxÞÞwith ϕ¼ K 01 and, hence, Γð0Þ ¼ 0. Thus, limα-0 ΩðαÞ ¼ 0. Since 12ψk θ V2ψ
	 
	 

40, this
implies existence of a critical threshold ~α40 such that (26) is satisfied if αo ~α.□
Proof of Proposition 3. For oAfB; Jg, if ψ4ψAo, then ~cAðψ Þo ~coðψ Þ—by Lemma 3(ii). Furthermore, ~cAðψ Þo ~cSðψ Þ for αo ~α—
by Lemma 4(ii). Together these observations imply that the set Coðψ Þ≔fcj~cAðψ Þocominf~coðψ Þ; ~cSðψ Þgg is not empty if
ψ4ψAo and αo ~α. Lemma 4(i) then yields that SðoÞ4SðAÞ for all cACoðψ Þ.□
Proof of Corollary 2. First, note that for a quadratic investment cost function we have
IA ¼ α
ψ
; I
A ¼ Vþα
2ψ
;
IB ¼ 0; IB ¼ V
2ψ
;
I J ¼ 0; I J ¼ V
2ψ
;
and
~cA ψ
 ¼ Vα
2
þðVαÞðVþ3αÞ
8ψ
; ð27Þ
~cB ψ
 ¼ Vβ
2
þ V
2
8ψ
; ð28Þ
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 ¼ V
2
þ V
2
8ψ
: ð29Þ
Note that ∂~coðψ Þ=∂ψo0 and ∂2 ~coðψ Þ=∂ψ240 for all oAfA;B; Jg. Also note that ~cAðψ Þ intersects exactly once with ~cJðψ Þ and
~cBðψ Þ, respectively:
~cA ψ
 
⋚~cJ ψ
 
⟺ ψ⋛ ~ψ AJ≔
1
2
V3
2
α
 
ð30Þ
and
~cA ψ
 
⋚~cB ψ
 
⟺ ψ⋛ ~ψ AB≔
α
αβ ~ψ
AJ : ð31Þ
These observations are depicted in Fig. 3.
Next, let us derive the total surplus for the different ownership structures given agent A's optimal investment behavior:
S Að Þ ¼
V 1þVþα
2ψ
 
2cψ
2
Vþα
2ψ
 2
if cr ~cAðψ Þ
α 1þα
ψ
 
ψ
2
α
ψ
 2
if c4 ~cAðψ Þ
8>><
>>:
ð32Þ
S Bð Þ ¼
V 1þ V
2ψ
 
2cψ
2
V
2ψ
 2
if cr ~cBðψ Þ
β if c4 ~cBðψ Þ
8><
>: ð33Þ
S Jð Þ ¼
V 1þ V
2ψ
 
2cψ
2
V
2ψ
 2
if cr ~cJðψ Þ
0 if c4 ~cJðψ Þ
8><
>: ð34Þ
First, suppose that cr ~cAðψ Þ such that both agents pay the transaction cost under A-ownership. If cr ~coðψ Þ, where
oAfJ;Bg, then both agents pay the transaction cost also under o-ownership. Comparison of the upper line in (32) with the
upper line in (33) or (34) shows that SðAÞ4SðoÞ holds as V4α2 by assumption. If, on the other hand, c4 ~c
oðψ Þ, where
oAfJ;Bg, then c is paid under A-ownership but not under o-ownership. Comparison of the upper line in (32) with the lower
lines in (33) and (34) yields
S Að Þ4S Bð Þ ⟺ co ~cA ψ þαβ
2
þVðV2αÞþ5α
2
16ψ
ð35Þ
and
S Að Þ4S Jð Þ ⟺ co ~cA ψ þα
2
þVðV2αÞþ5α
2
16ψ
: ð36Þ
As cr ~cAðψ Þ by hypothesis, these two conditions are always satisfied under our assumptions. Thus, whenever c is paid for A
-ownership but not for o-ownership, where oAfB; Jg, the total surplus is higher under A-ownership than under o-ownership.
Overall, we thus have SðAÞ4SðoÞ, where oAfB; Jg, whenever cr ~cAðψ Þ.
Second, suppose c4maxf~cAðψ Þ; ~cJðψ Þg, such that c is not paid irrespective of the ownership structure. Comparison of the
lower line in (32) with the lower lines in (33) and (34) shows that SðAÞ4SðBÞ4SðJÞ holds, because 12ψα2þα4β40.
Finally, suppose that ~cAðψ Þocr ~coðψ Þ, such that c is paid under oAfB; Jg but not under o¼A. Then
SðoÞ⋛S Að Þ ⟺ c⋚~cS ψ ¼ Vα
2
þ3V
24α2
16ψ
; ð37Þ
where ∂~cSðψ Þ=∂ψo0 and ∂2 ~cSðψ Þ=∂ψ240. Furthermore, with V4αð2þ
ffiffiffi
2
p
Þ by assumption, we have ~cSðψ Þ4 ~cAðψ Þ. Finally,
~cSAðψ Þ intersects exactly once with ~cJðψ Þ and ~cBðψ Þ, respectively:
~cS ψ
 
⋛~cJ ψ
 
⟺ ψ⋚ ~ψ SJ≔
V24α2
8α
ð38Þ
and
~cS ψ
 
⋛~cB ψ
 
⟺ ψ⋚ ~ψ SB≔
α
αβ ~ψ
SJ ; ð39Þ
where, with V4αð2þ
ffiffiffi
2
p
Þ, we have ~ψ AJo ~ψ SJ and ~ψ ABo ~ψ SB. These observations are depicted in Fig. 4.
It then follows that the sets CJ≔fðc;ψ Þjmaxf~cAðψ Þ; ~cBðψ Þgocominf~cJðψ Þ; ~cSðψ Þgg and
CBJ≔fðc;ψ Þj~cAðψ Þocominf~cBðψ Þ; ~cSðψ Þgg are not empty. The proof then is completed by the following observations: for cACJ
D. Müller, P.W. Schmitz / European Economic Review 87 (2016) 92–107 107or c¼ ~cJðψ ÞAð~cAðψ Þ; ~cSðψ ÞÞ, we have SðJÞ4SðAÞ4SðBÞ; for cACBJ or c¼ ~cBðψ ÞAð~cAðψ Þ; ~cSðψ ÞÞ, we have SðJÞ ¼ SðBÞ4SðAÞ; for
cA ½~cSðψ Þ; ~cJðψ Þ, SðAÞZmaxfSðJÞ; SðBÞg.□Appendix B. Supplementary data
Supplementary material related to this article can be found, in the online version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.euro
ecorev.2016.04.013.References
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